I. Introduction
The presence of foreign firms in the U.S. economy has grown significantly during the past 30 years. In particular, foreign firms have acquired a substantial portion of U.S. assets and now control many U.S. firms. Graham and Krugman (1995) show that foreign firms accounted for between 11% and 19% of the U.S. manufacturing sector as of the end of 1992. According to the NYSE Fact Book, at year end 1970, foreign investors owned only 3% of total equity in U.S. firms. Foreign equity ownership, however, had increased to 11% by year end 2001. In spite of the substantial foreign presence in the United States and the controversy surrounding foreign takeovers of U.S. firms, We examine post-takeover restructuring activity and the sources of gains in large U.S. targets of foreign acquirers. We find that layoffs and sell-offs are less important in justifying the target premium in foreign takeovers than in domestic takeovers. In contrast, U.S. targets in foreign takeovers subsequently make more post-takeover investments than those in domestic takeovers. The likelihood of these posttakeover restructuring activities is significantly influenced by target characteristics. Finally, the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 has had a significant positive effect on target returns. These results suggest that the realization of synergy is the main motive behind foreign takeovers.
foreign takeover activity in the United States is not fully understood. 1 In particular, there is little evidence concerning what drives foreign takeover activity in the United States, how this activity compares with domestic takeover activity, whether the motives behind foreign hostile takeovers are different from those behind foreign friendly takeovers, what happens to target firms after takeovers, and where the target shareholders' gains come from.
To better understand these issues, we use a sample of 228 large U.S. targets acquired by foreign firms and a control sample of 228 U.S. targets acquired by domestic firms during the 1980-98 period. We examine whether foreign acquirers behave differently from their U.S. counterparts in restructuring U.S. targets after takeovers by searching for post-takeover layoffs, sell-offs, and investments and acquisitions.
There are several possible reasons why foreign bidders would behave differently from domestic bidders regarding post-takeover target restructuring. First, foreigners may acquire U.S. firms to gain a foothold in the U.S. market, while domestic firms acquire U.S. firms for other purposes. In this case, we would expect foreign bidders to lay off fewer target employees, to keep more target assets, and to make more investments/acquisitions for target operation than domestic bidders do. Second, as we will discuss later, the tax change in the United States is likely to have significantly differential effects on foreign and domestic acquirers regarding such restructuring. For example, if the tax benefit is an important source of takeover gain, we should expect that foreign acquirers are more willing to make additional post-takeover investments and acquisitions in U.S. targets after 1986 to take advantage of tax rule changes in that year. Third, because of the differences in the working of the market for corporate control and corporate cultures between the United States and foreign countries, foreign acquirers from some countries may be less inclined to engage in certain types of restructuring activities than domestic acquirers.
To examine the potential differences in the sources of takeover gains between foreign and domestic takeovers, we estimate cost savings from the restructuring activities and analyze to what extent these savings can justify takeover premiums paid to targets. We also investigate whether target and contest-specific characteristics influence the likelihood of post-takeover restructuring and investment activities. Finally, to evaluate the strategic motives of foreign firms that acquire U.S. targets, we search for the identity of the buyers who purchase U.S. target assets from foreign acquirers. We analyze the industrial relatedness between U.S. target assets sold off by foreign firms and the buyers of these assets.
In addition to adding insight into the sources of gains in foreign takeovers, our article also reexamines the effect of taxes on foreign acquisitions in the United States. Scholes and Wolfson (1990) argue that tax rule changes in the 1. Most of the previous studies on foreign takeovers in the United States focus on stock price reactions of U.S. targets at the acquisition announcements and their cross-sectional determinants. See, e.g., Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) , Kang (1993) , Servaes and Zenner (1994) , and Dewenter (1995). 1980s had different effects on the demands for mergers and acquisitions of U.S. targets by domestic and foreign bidders. They argue that the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which substantially reduced tax advantages for domestic mergers and acquisitions, discouraged the demand for domestic takeovers but increased the demand for foreign takeovers in the United States. Given differences in statutory tax rates across tax jurisdictions, the reduction in the marginal corporate tax rate in the United States after 1986 made the United States a tax haven for many European countries as well as Japan, Canada, and Australia, all of which face higher corporate tax rates at home. Therefore, investors from such countries may place a higher value on U.S. assets than do U.S. investors.
To measure the effect of the 1986 U.S. tax change on the market value of target, previous studies (Harris and Ravenscraft 1991; Kang 1993; Servaes and Zenner 1994) simply use the indicator variable that takes the value of one if the bid is made after 1986. 2 The problem with this approach is that it does not consider differences in statutory tax rates across tax jurisdictions. To remedy this problem, we explicitly consider whether the bidders faced higher corporate tax rates in their home countries than in the United States after 1986.
Our article is closely related to work by Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) , who analyze post-takeover layoffs and sell-offs in domestic hostile takeovers. Using a sample of 62 domestic hostile takeovers between 1984 and 1986 that involved a bid price of $50 million or more, Bhagat et al. (1990) investigate what drives domestic hostile takeovers and where the evident wealth gains to target firms' shareholders come from. They find that layoffs are an important but not dominant source of hostile takeover gains. Layoffs can justify, on average, about 10%-20% of the target premium. In contrast, sell-offs are a pervasive result of hostile takeovers and can explain, on average, about 31% of the acquisition price. They also find that hostile takeovers largely involve the allocation of businesses to firms owning other related businesses, indicating that such takeovers serve to increase concentration. In this article, we adopt an approach similar to that used by Bhagat et al. (1990) , but we perform further extensive analyses to shed light on the motives and sources of gains in foreign takeovers.
Although our article does not provide complete answers concerning the sources of gains and the motives that drive foreign takeovers in the United States, we find several results that help us understand these issues. We find that layoffs and sell-offs in foreign takeovers can explain a less important portion of the target premium than those in domestic takeovers: layoffs in our sample of foreign takeovers can justify only 1.9%-5.0% of the target premium and sell-offs only 6.2% of the acquisition price. In comparison, for the control sample of domestic takeovers, layoffs can justify 14.1%-37.2% 2. Evidence on Scholes and Wolfson's (1990) argument using this approach is mixed. Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) show that U.S. target returns in foreign takeovers decrease after 1986, but Servaes and Zenner (1994) find that they increase after 1986. Kang (1993) finds no tax effect in target returns. of the target premium and sell-offs 22.8% of the acquisition price. Furthermore, acquired targets in foreign takeovers subsequently make substantial acquisitions or investments-about $100 million, which is 9.5% of the average acquisition price. The corresponding figure for those in domestic takeovers is $11 million, which is 5.8% of the average acquisition price. These results suggest that foreign firms acquire U.S. targets to gain an improved position in the U.S. market. The subsample analysis indicates that both friendly and hostile targets in foreign takeovers lay off fewer employees, keep more assets, and make more investments/acquisitions than those in domestic takeovers do. We also find that the function of foreign takeovers is similar to that of domestic takeovers: both foreign and domestic acquirers allocate a large portion of target assets to strategic buyers in the same lines of business.
The analysis of post-takeover restructuring activities of foreign acquirers in U.S. targets indicates that the likelihood of such activities is significantly related to target financial characteristics and contest-specific variables. We find that foreign firms are more likely to lay off employees and/or to sell off assets when U.S. targets have a low Tobin's q, suggesting that they have stronger incentive to undertake restructuring activity when U.S. targets have a lower growth opportunity. The likelihood of downsizing actions also increases when U.S. firms are targets in hostile takeovers. Thus, foreign bidders are more likely to implement a revised operating strategy of the target when they are involved in hostile takeovers. We find similar results for U.S. targets of domestic acquirers. However, unlike U.S. targets of domestic acquirers, U.S. targets of foreign acquirers are more likely to undertake post-takeover investments and acquisitions when they also engage in post-takeover layoffs and/or sell-offs. This result suggests that post-takeover expansionary policies established by foreign acquirers in U.S. target firms are positively related to post-takeover contractionary actions in targets.
Finally, unlike previous studies (Harris and Ravenscraft 1991; Kang 1993; Dewenter 1995) , we find that the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986, which reduced the marginal corporate tax rate in the United States, has had a significant positive effect on target gains. Shareholders of U.S. targets also earn higher returns when foreign bidders use cash as the method of payment and when there are multiple bidders. Target returns are also positively related to the ratio of advertising expenses to sales. This result indicates that the possession of firm-specific advantages, such as intensive advertising activity, is an important determinant of foreign takeover premiums. In contrast, target returns are negatively related to Tobin's q. If Tobin's q measures either growth opportunities or the managerial ability of the firm (Lang, Stulz, and Walkling 1989; Servaes 1991) , this result suggests that U.S. firms with lower growth opportunities or less efficient management teams experience higher returns when they become the target of foreign takeovers.
Overall, our results suggest that foreign acquirers are the eventual strategic users of U.S. target resources. The results provide strong support for the notion that the sources of gains in foreign takeovers come mainly from this synergy and that the realization of synergy including tax benefits is the main motive behind foreign takeovers.
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. Section II describes our data and the characteristics of our sample. In Section III, we describe post-takeover restructuring and investment activities in U.S. targets and conduct a logistic analysis of these activities. Section IV presents stock-price reactions to takeover announcements and the results from the cross-sectional analysis of announcement day returns. A summary and concluding remarks are presented in Section V.
II. Data and Sample Characteristics
Our sample consists of U.S. target firms that were acquired by foreign firms and subsequently delisted from stock exchanges during the period from 1980 to 1998. We identify an initial sample of targets from the Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum of Thomson Financial. Since too little information about post-takeover changes in target firms is available for small deals, we restrict our sample to targets with offer prices of over $50 million. 3 We exclude cases in which no information on takeover announcement is available in Factiva. We also require that target firms be included in the CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) daily stock return file. These screens result in a final sample of 228 firms. We use as the announcement date the date that a takeover announcement first appears in Factiva. Data on target financial characteristics and institutional ownership are obtained from COMPUSTAT and Thomson Financial, respectively.
To compare post-takeover restructuring activities of U.S. targets in foreign takeovers with those in domestic takeovers, we construct a control sample of 228 U.S. targets that were acquired by domestic firms during the 1980-98 period. A U.S. target involved in the domestic takeover is matched to that in the foreign takeover by type of acquisition (friendly, hostile, and white knight), target industry (at least to the first two digits of the SIC code), target size (the closest in the market value of equity), and year of acquisition. If no firm matches by year of acquisition, a control target matched in the previous or the following year is used. Table 1 describes the distribution of the sample of the 228 foreign takeovers by year and by the home country of the bidder. It shows that foreign takeovers were particularly active during the two subperiods of 1986-89 and 1995-97. These two subperiods account for 73% of the total number of transactions. Furthermore, the majority of foreign bidders come from G-7 countries, including the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Japan, France, and Italy, representing about 67% of transactions. The remaining acquirers are spread among the Netherlands (5%), Switzerland (7%), and other countries (22%). Note.-The sample consists of 228 U.S. target firms that were acquired by foreign firms and subsequently delisted from stock exchanges during the period 1980-98. The initial sample of U.S. target firms was obtained from the Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum of Thomson Financial. The sample firms were restricted to those that involved a purchase price of $50 million or more, had public announcement dates of takeovers in Factiva, and were listed on the CRSP daily stock return file at the time of the announcement.
Although not reported in table 1, a breakdown of the sample by target industry shows that the most likely targets are in manufacturing (60%), followed by service (16%) and the wholesale and retail trade (14%). Table 2 presents the distribution of bid prices for both foreign and domestic takeovers. The mean bid price offered by a foreign (domestic) acquirer is $770.6 ($656.8) million, and the median price is $297.3 ($220.8) million, with a range from $50.0 ($50.0) million to $7.9 ($12.1) billion. Table 3 shows the classification of the sample into targets of friendly takeovers, hostile takeovers, and white knights, according to the target managerial reaction to the initial bid from the acquirers. We classify a takeover as hostile if the target management resisted an unsolicited offer as determined by the SDC and as friendly if no such resistance was mounted by the management. White knight refers to the case in which an acquirer made a friendly offer or reached an agreement to acquire a target that had been the subject of a hostile or unsolicited offer by another company. Not surprisingly, as shown in table 3, many foreign bidders tend to undertake friendly takeovers (79.7%). Hostile takeovers account for about 13.2% and takeovers as white knights about 7.1%. This takeover distribution contrasts somewhat with that of domestic takeovers. For example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) , using the sample of Fortune Note.-The sample consists of 228 U.S. targets in foreign takeovers and 228 U.S. control targets in domestic takeovers during the period 1980-98. The initial sample of U.S. targets was obtained from the Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum of Thomson Financial. The sample firms were restricted to those that involved a purchase price of $50 million or more, had public announcement dates of takeovers in Factiva, and were listed on the CRSP daily stock return file at the time of the announcement. A U.S. target in the domestic takeover is matched to that in the foreign takeover by type of acquisition (friendly, hostile, and white knight), industry (at least to the first two digits of the SIC code), firm size (the closest in the market value of equity), and year of acquisition. Transaction prices for both foreign and domestic acquisitions were obtained from the SDC database. 500 firms as of 1980, find that during the period 1981-85, 32 of 66 non-MBO (non-management-buyout) takeovers had started out hostile (49%) and 34 as friendly (52%). Thus, in comparison with domestic acquirers, foreign acquirers appear to favor friendly takeovers. Given previous empirical findings that disciplinary takeovers tend to be hostile and synergistic takeovers friendly (Morck et al. 1988) , our results indirectly indicate that the realization of synergy may be the main motive behind foreign takeovers.
To see whether foreign firms prefer U.S. targets with certain characteristics, we investigate target characteristics before the acquisitions and report the results in table 4. The theory of foreign direct investment (FDI) argues that FDI is motivated by market failure in the trade of proprietary knowledge, such as research and development, advertising, capital investment, and entrepreneurial expertise (Buckley and Casson 1976; Dunning 1977) . According to Buckley and Casson (1976) , markets for intermediate products (i.e., products that take the form of organizational skills and are inseparable from the firm itself) are difficult to organize and costly to use due to their imperfections, and thus multinational firms have an incentive to bypass imperfections through the creation of internal markets. This argument suggests that, for cross-border mergers and acquisitions to take place, foreign bidding firms and/or target firms in the host country should have firm-specific advantages that help foreign Note.-The sample consists of 228 U.S. target firms that were acquired by foreign firms and subsequently delisted from stock exchanges during the period 1980-98. The initial sample of U.S. target firms was obtained from the Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum of Thomson Financial. The sample firms were restricted to those that involved a purchase price of $50 million or more, had public announcement dates of takeovers in Factiva, and were listed on the CRSP daily stock return file at the time of the announcement. An acquisition is classified as hostile if the target management resisted an unsolicited offer as determined by the SDC and as friendly if no such resistance was mounted by the management. White knight refers to the case in which an acquirer made a friendly offer or reached an agreement to acquire a target that had been the subject of a hostile or unsolicited offer by another company. Note.-The sample consists of 228 U.S. targets in foreign takeovers and 228 U.S. control targets in domestic takeovers during the period 1980-98. The initial sample of U.S. targets was obtained from the Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum of Thomson Financial. The sample firms were restricted to those that involved a purchase price of $50 million or more, had public announcement dates of takeovers in Factiva, and were listed on the CRSP daily stock return file at the time of the announcement. A U.S. target in the domestic takeover was matched to that in the foreign takeover by type of acquisition (friendly, hostile, and white knight), industry (at least to the first two digits of the SIC code), firm size (the closest in the market value of equity), and year of acquisition. Data on target financial characteristics and institutional ownership were obtained from COMPUSTAT and Thomson Financial. Tobin's q p (market value of equity ϩ book value of debt)/book value of assets. acquiring firms internalize these advantages through intermediate products.
We measure firm-specific advantages of targets using operating income as a fraction of total assets, Tobin's q ([market value of equity ϩ book value of debt]/book value of total assets), the ratios of R&D expenses, advertising expenses, and capital expenditure, all normalized by total sale. We measure target characteristics at the fiscal year end that comes immediately before the announcements of the takeover. Table 4 , however, shows that there are no notable differences in firm characteristics across these two groups.
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III. Post-takeover Restructuring Activities
In this section, we examine post-takeover layoff and sell-off activities in U.S. targets and estimate the extent to which these activities justify the target premium or the bid price paid by foreign acquirers. To make our results comparable with those of Bhagat et al. (1990) , we closely follow their approach in our analysis. In an effort to further identify the potential motives behind foreign takeovers, we also investigate post-takeover investment and acquisition activities in U.S. targets, which are not examined in Bhagat et al. (1990) . For each target, we search for information on post-takeover changes for 3 years, starting from the date of takeover announcement. The search is conducted using a comprehensive set of sources, including Factiva, Predicasts F&S Index, Moody's Manual, annual reports, 10k forms, proxy statements, and the International Annual Report by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (1980-88) . Factiva is a searchable full-text database of nearly 8,000 newswires, newspapers, magazines, and trade journals, including Business Week, Dow Jones and Reuters Newswires, and the Wall Street Journal. Predicasts F&S Index is an annual index for hundreds of financial publications, major newspapers, business periodicals, trade magazines, and special reports. Given the richness of these news sources, we expect that, for most of the targets in our sample, our search results provide a reasonably complete coverage of the post-takeover restructuring and investment activities. Nevertheless, there may be a bias in the media coverage against small targets. To the extent that less information is available for smaller deals, our estimates of post-takeover changes may be biased downward. However, since our analysis relies extensively on the comparison between foreign and domestic takeovers, and since targets in these two types of takeovers are matched by firm size, the bias against small targets is expected to have little impact on our results.
A. Post-takeover Layoffs
To estimate the present value of labor cost savings, we follow Bhagat et al. (1990) and assume that the after-tax cost of a blue collar worker is $20,000 in 1986 and that of a white collar worker is $50,000. Since our sample period is over six times longer than their sample period, we adjust annual wages for other years by the Bureau of Labor Statistics's employment cost indices for blue and white collar workers. In cases where we cannot identify layoffs as white or blue collar, we assume that they are all blue collar. We also assume that the discount rate for calculating the present value is 10%. We estimate labor cost savings in two ways: first, by assuming that they will last 5 years, and, second, by assuming that they are permanent. To examine the importance of layoffs in justifying the takeover premium, we compute the ratio of the present value of labor cost savings to the takeover premium. The premium is estimated as the difference between the bid price and the market value of a target 20 trading days prior to the initial bid announcement. Table 5 presents employee layoffs and expected labor cost savings for the sample of 45 targets of foreign firms in which information on layoffs is available. Seventeen of these 45 targets lay off employees without engaging in any form of asset sales. We find that layoffs in the U.S. target firms mostly come from consolidation of headquarters, plant closures, staff reductions, and consolidation of production. For 16 targets, we cannot identify the number of layoffs. For the remaining 29 targets in which the number of layoffs is known, the number of employees laid off ranges from 19 to 2,400. The average layoff for these firms is 394 employees (363 blue collar workers and 257 white collar workers), which constitutes 6.6% of the workforce. The annual estimated savings from layoffs ranges from $1.0 million to $144.6 million, with the average being $13.9 million. If these savings last for 5 years, the present value of labor cost savings ranges from $3.9 million to $548.2 million, the average being $52.6 million (13.9% of the acquisition premium). If these savings continue indefinitely, they can justify, on average, 36.7% of the premium and over 50% of the premium in seven out of 29 cases.
To understand the role of layoffs in different types of foreign takeovers, we also report post-takeover layoffs by target managerial reaction in table 5. Labor cost savings as a percent of the premium are higher for hostile takeovers than for friendly takeovers. Labor cost savings based on a 5-year calculation are, on average, 24% for hostile takeovers, 11.5% for friendly takeovers, and 2.5% for white knights. Those based on perpetuity for hostile, friendly, and white knight takeovers are 63.4%, 30.4%, and 6.7%, respectively. The fact that targets of white knights lay off fewer employees than targets in other types of takeovers suggests that foreign white knights are reluctant to break their promise not to engage in massive employee layoffs. These results are consistent with those of Bhagat et al. (1990) , who show that white knights make fewer layoffs than do successful hostile acquirers in domestic takeovers.
One hundred and eighty-three out of 228 firms have no information about layoffs. Assuming that these firms had no layoffs, labor cost savings for the sample of 212 firms, including the 29 firms for which the number of layoffs can be identified, are, on average, $1.9 million a year. The present value of labor cost savings for the 212 firms is, on average, $7.2 million (1.9% of the premium) if savings last for 5 years and $19 million (5.0% of the premium) if they are permanent. These results indicate that layoffs are clearly not the whole story behind foreign takeovers. When we divide these firms into the categories of friendly, hostile, and white knight, the average labor cost savings as a percent of the premium is still higher for hostile than for friendly takeovers (6.2% vs. 1.4% for 5 years and 16.4% vs. 3.6% for perpetuity). Therefore, layoffs turn out to be a more important source of gains for hostile takeovers than for friendly ones.
To see whether the importance of layoffs in justifying the takeover premium is different between foreign and domestic takeovers, table 5 also shows employee layoffs and expected labor cost savings for control targets in domestic takeovers. During the period 1980-98, 228 control targets announced 77 cases of layoffs (19 cases in which the number of layoffs is unknown and 58 cases in which the number of layoffs is known). Thus, U.S. acquirers are more than 1.7 times as likely to engage in layoffs as are foreign acquirers. The average layoff for the 58 firms in which the number of layoffs is known is 481 employees, with the average annual savings being $15.6 million. If these savings last for 5 years, the present value of labor cost savings can justify, on average, 50.9% of the premium. If these savings are permanent, they can justify, on average, 134.1% of the premium. These results suggest that labor cost savings as a percent of the premium for U.S. acquirers is at least three times larger than those for foreign acquirers.
When we divide the 58 firms into the subgroups of friendly, hostile, and white knight, the average savings as a percent of the premium is highest for friendly takeovers (63.5% for 5 years and 167% for perpetuity), followed by hostile takeovers (25% for 5 years and 66.1% for perpetuity) and white knights (5.5% for 5 years and 14.5% for perpetuity). Thus, like those in foreign takeovers, white knights in domestic takeovers generally engage in only a few layoffs. However, unlike layoffs in foreign friendly takeovers, those in domestic friendly takeovers explain a substantial portion of the target premium, suggesting that the motives that drive foreign friendly takeovers are different from those that drive domestic friendly takeovers.
Assuming that the 151 firms in which the number of layoffs is unknown had no layoffs, labor cost savings for the sample of 209 firms (151 firms for which there was no information about layoffs and 58 firms for which the number of layoffs was known) is, on average, $4.3 million a year. The present value of labor cost savings accounts for, on average, 14.1% of the premium if savings last for 5 years and 37.2% of the premium if they are permanent. The analysis of the subsamples categorized by target managerial reaction shows similar results as that using the target sample for which the number of layoffs was known.
Overall, our results suggest that the importance of layoffs in justifying takeover premium is much smaller for foreign takeovers than for domestic takeovers. In particular, layoffs in foreign friendly takeovers explain a significantly less important portion of the target premium than do those in domestic friendly takeovers. Note.-The sample consists of 228 U.S. targets in foreign takeovers and 228 U.S. control targets in domestic takeovers during the period 1980-98. The sample firms were restricted to those that involved a purchase price of $50 million or more. A U.S. target in the domestic takeover was matched to that in the foreign takeover by type of acquisition (friendly, hostile, and white knight), industry, firm size, and year of acquisition. Data on post-takeover layoffs were obtained from Predicasts F&S Index, Factiva, Moody's Manuals, annual reports, 10k forms, and the International Annual Report by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research. Post-takeover layoffs for 3 years were considered, starting from the date of takeover announcement. To estimate the present value of labor cost savings, the following assumptions were made: (1) the after-tax cost of a blue collar worker is $20,000 per annum and that of a white collar worker $50,000 per annum in the year of 1986. The after-tax cost for other years was obtained by adjusting these figures by the Bureau of Labor Statistics's employment cost indices for blue and white collar workers; (2) when the identification of layoffs as white or blue collar is not clear, they are all blue collar; and (3) the discount rate for calculating the present value is 10%. Labor cost savings were estimated in two ways: (1) by assuming that they would last 5 years and (2) by assuming that they would be permanent. The takeover premium is defined as the difference between the bid price and the market value of a target 20 trading days prior to the initial bid announcement. An acquisition is classified as hostile if the target management resisted an unsolicited offer as determined by the Security Data Corporation (SDC) and as friendly if no such resistance was mounted by the management. White knight refers to the case in which an acquirer made a friendly offer or reached an agreement to acquire a target that had been the subject of a hostile or unsolicited offer by another company.
B. Post-takeover Sell-offs
As with layoffs, we follow the same empirical design used by Bhagat et al. (1990) to examine post-takeover divestitures. The value of sell-offs and the ratio of sell-offs to acquisition price (bid price ϩ long-term debt) are reported in table 6. In 77 (33.8%) out of 228 targets of foreign firms, there is evidence of sell-offs. Forty-nine out of these 77 targets engage in asset sales without layoffs. For 45 out of 77 cases, we can identify the sale prices, and we find that, on average, 27.1% of the acquisition price is recouped through sell-offs. In six cases, foreign acquirers recoup more than half of the acquisition price, and in one case, they obtain more than 80%. The classification of 45 targets by target managerial reaction shows that the average of sell-offs as a percent of the acquisition price is 27.4% for targets of hostile takeovers, 26.2% for targets of friendly takeovers, and 31.1% for targets of white knights.
To examine the types of buyers participating in sell-offs, we again follow Bhagat et al. (1990) and divide the buyers into those that are related (buyers who own a business in the same or a closely related industry as the assets they purchase in sell-offs); those that are unrelated; those from MBOs; those that purchase headquarters, real estate, and securities; and those that are not identified. Table 6 shows that the majority of sell-offs are to related buyers. These buyers acquire 82.9% ($13.3 billion) of the total volume of sell-offs ($16.1 billion). In contrast, unrelated buyers account for only 7.2% ($1.1 billion) of the total sell-offs, MBOs 5.7% ($909 million), and others 4.9% ($781 million). Table 6 also shows that sell-offs to the related buyers represent 86.8% of the total selloffs for friendly targets, 76.2% for hostile targets, and 96.4% for white knights. These results suggest that, irrespective of the type of acquisition, more than 75% of target assets are allocated to firms in a related industry.
One hundred and fifty-one out of 228 firms have no information about selloffs. Assuming these firms had no sell-offs, the average sell-offs for the sample of 196 firms, including 45 firms for which the prices of sell-offs are known, is $81.9 million. The classification of targets by managerial reaction shows that the average sell-offs for friendly, hostile, and white knight takeovers are $36.7 million, $333.1 million, and $171.6 million, respectively. The averages of selloffs as a percent of the acquisition price are 6.2% for the sample of 196 firms, 4.1% for targets of friendly takeovers, 17.2% for targets of hostile takeovers, and 12% for targets of white knights, indicating that hostile acquirers tend to sell off relatively more target assets than do friendly acquirers. This finding suggests that friendly acquirers are more likely to keep target resources than are hostile acquirers and that friendly takeovers are driven by foreign firms' desire to gain a foothold or an improved position in the U.S. market.
For the control sample of domestic takeovers, we find evidence of sell-offs in 111 (48.7%) out of 228 cases. Therefore, the frequency of sell-offs in domestic takeovers is considerably higher than that in foreign takeovers. Among these 111 firms, information on the sale price is available for 68 cases. For this subsample of 68 targets, the average of sell-offs as a fraction of the acquisition price is 62.1%, which is substantially larger than 27.1% for the corresponding sample of foreign takeovers. Including 117 firms that have no information about sell-offs in the analysis shows a similar pattern (22.8% vs. 6.2%). The analysis of the subsamples by managerial reaction shows that the average of sell-offs as a fraction of the acquisition price is 64.2% for domestic friendly takeovers, 62.3% for domestic hostile takeovers, and 43.1% for targets of domestic white knight. The corresponding figures for the target sample adding the 117 firms that have no information about sell-offs are 18.2%, 50.3%, and 19.6%, respectively. These results indicate that, unlike in foreign takeovers, sell-offs can be an important source of gains in domestic takeovers, particularly in hostile takeovers.
We also find that, as in the case of foreign takeovers, a majority of selloffs in domestic takeovers are to buyers in the same or a closely related industry (75.6%). Therefore, our results suggest that both foreign and domestic takeovers perform a similar function in the sense that they allocate target resources to strategic acquirers in the same lines of business, which serves to increase concentration.
To further investigate whether foreign bidders are the eventual strategic users of U.S. target resources, table 7 also reports the allocation of target assets after takeovers by the final owners. Of the $140.1 billion of the total target assets, 88.5% ($124.1 billion) are retained by initial foreign bidders, and 9.5% ($13.3 billion) are sold off to related buyers. Taken together, 98% ($137.4 billion) ends up in the hands of either foreign bidders or buyers in closely related industries. In comparison, of the $124.8 billion of the total target assets in domestic takeovers, 78.1% ($97.5 billion) are retained by initial domestic bidders, and 16.5% ($20.6 billion) end up in the hands of firms managing similar assets. Thus, about 96% ($118.1 billion) ends up in the hands of either domestic bidders or buyers in similar industries. These results suggest that foreign firms tend to keep more assets than do their domestic counterparts, indicating that foreign firms acquire U.S. targets with strategic motives. They also suggest that both foreign and domestic takeovers serve to allocate target resources to final strategic owners.
C. Post-takeover Investments and Acquisitions
So far, we have shown that foreign firms tend to acquire U.S. targets for synergistic rather than disciplinary purposes. If the realization of synergy is the main motive that drives foreign takeovers, we would expect foreign acquirers to make additional post-takeover investments in targets to achieve their strategic goals. Table 8 examines this issue and summarizes investments (new plant construction, plant or branch expansion, and other capital expenditure) and acquisitions made by U.S. target firms after takeovers. In 108 out of 228 targets of foreign firms, there is evidence of additional investments and acquisitions, and in 71 cases we can identify the actual amounts. For these 71 firms, the average amount of investments/acquisitions is $269.3 million, which Note.-The sample consists of 228 U.S. targets in foreign takeovers and 228 U.S. control targets in domestic takeovers during the period 1980-98. The sample firms were restricted to those that involved a purchase price of $50 million or more. A U.S. target in the domestic takeover was matched to that in the foreign takeover by type of acquisition (friendly, hostile, and white knight), industry, firm size, and year of acquisition. Data on post-takeover sell-offs were obtained from Predicasts F&S Index, Factiva, Moody's Manuals, annual reports, 10k forms, and the International Annual Report by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research. Post-takeover sell-offs for 3 years are considered, starting from the date of takeover announcement. An acquisition is classified as hostile if the target management resisted an unsolicited offer as determined by the Security Data Corporation (SDC) and as friendly if no such resistance was mounted by the management. White knight refers to the case in which an acquirer made a friendly offer or reached an agreement to acquire a target that had been the subject of a hostile or unsolicited offer by another company. Note.-The sample consists of 228 U.S. targets in foreign takeovers and 228 U.S. control targets in domestic takeovers during the period 1980-98. The sample firms were restricted to those that involved a purchase price of $50 million or more. A U.S. target in the domestic takeover was matched to that in the foreign takeover by type of acquisition (friendly, hostile, and white knight), industry, firm size, and year of acquisition. Data on post-takeover sell-offs were obtained from Predicasts F&S Index, Factiva, Moody's Manuals, annual reports, 10k forms, and the International Annual Report by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research. Post-takeover sell-offs for 3 years are considered, starting from the date of takeover announcement. Related buyers refer to those that own a business in the same or a closely related industry as the assets they purchase in the sell-offs. MBO p management buyout.
represents 25.5% of the acquisition price (bid price plus long-term debt) paid by foreign bidders. In 12 cases, more than half of the previous acquisition price is additionally invested to expand plants or to acquire other U.S. firms. The expansionary and contractionary policies evidenced by the sample of U.S. targets are not mutually exclusive. Of the 108 U.S. targets that make posttakeover investments or acquisitions, 62 also engage in layoffs and/or selloffs. Of these, 19 firms engage in both layoffs and sell-offs.
Table 8 also suggests that hostile targets make two times as many investments/acquisitions as do friendly targets. The targets of friendly takeovers, hostile takeovers, and white knights, on average, make post-takeover investments and acquisitions amounting to 19.1%, 36.5%, and 44.8% of the previous acquisition price, respectively. These results, coupled with our previous findings that foreign hostile acquirers are more likely to lay off target employees and/or to sell off target assets than are foreign friendly acquirers, suggest that they undertake post-takeover downsizing activities to implement active restructuring plans rather than to recoup the acquisition price.
One hundred and twenty firms out of 228 have no information about posttakeover investments or acquisitions. Assuming that those firms made no investments or acquisitions, the average amount of investments and acquisitions for the sample of 191 firms, including the 71 firms for which the amount of investments or acquisitions is known, is $100.1 million. The average amounts of investments and acquisitions as a fraction of the previous acquisition price are, respectively, 9.5% for 191 firms, 6.1% for targets of friendly takeovers, 21.6% for targets of hostile takeovers, and 22.4% for targets of white knights. Table 8 also summarizes investments and acquisitions made by U.S. control targets of domestic firms from 1980 to 1998. In 51 out of 228 control targets, there is evidence of additional investments and acquisitions. Thus, foreign acquirers are approximately twice as likely to engage in post-takeover expansionary policies compared to domestic acquirers and appear to engage in asset contraction policies with considerably lower frequencies than U.S. acquirers do. Out of 51 firms, price information on additional investments and acquisitions is available for only 23 cases. For these 23 cases, the average amount of investments and acquisitions as a fraction of the previous acquisition price is 50.7%. However, the median for this variable is considerably lower, at 7.7%. Thus, the sample consists largely of post-takeover investments and acquisitions that are small in dollar amounts, but it does include a few relatively large cases of additional investments and acquisitions. The averages (medians) of additional investments and acquisitions as a percent of the acquisition price are 57.4% (6.3%) for targets of friendly takeovers, 40.5% (40.5%) for targets of hostile takeovers, and 17.2% (18.7%) for targets of white knights. However, the sample sizes for hostile takeovers and white knights are only two and three, respectively. Therefore, these results should be interpreted with caution.
For a sample of 200 control targets (including 177 firms that do not have information about post-takeover investments or acquisitions), the averages of additional investments and acquisitions as a percent of the acquisition price is 5.8%. It is 6.5% for targets of friendly takeovers, 3.1% for targets of hostile takeovers, and 3.7% for targets of white knights. These numbers clearly suggest that U.S. targets acquired by foreign firms subsequently make substantially more post-takeover investments or acquisitions than those acquired by domestic firms and that foreign takeovers are mainly motivated by the pursuit of synergy.
D. Are Post-takeover Restructuring and Expansionary Activities
Time Varying?
Our sample period encompasses two distinct merger waves in the United States (Holmstrom and Kaplan 2001) . Unlike the synergistic merger wave in the 1990s, that in the 1980s features significantly higher reliance on leverage and exhibits much more intense hostility. To assess the impact of these distinctive characteristics of merger waves in the United States on post-takeover restructuring and expansionary decisions by foreign acquirers, we divide our sample takeovers into those in the 1980s and those in the 1990s.
Panel A of table 9 shows that, for both merger wave periods, targets in foreign takeovers always engage in significantly fewer layoffs and sell-offs Note.-The sample consists of 228 U.S. targets in foreign takeovers and 228 U.S. control targets in domestic takeovers during the period 1980-98. The sample firms were restricted to those that involved a purchase price of $50 million or more. A U.S. target in the domestic takeover was matched to that in the foreign takeover by type of acquisition (friendly, hostile, and white knight), industry, firm size, and year of acquisition. Data on post-takeover investments and acquisitions were obtained from Predicasts F&S Index, Factiva, Moody's Manuals, annual reports, 10k forms, and the International Annual Report by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research. Post-takeover investments and acquisitions for 3 years are considered, starting from the date of takeover announcement. An acquisition is classified as hostile if the target management resisted an unsolicited offer as determined by the Security Data Corporation (SDC) and as friendly if no such resistance was mounted by the management. White knight refers to the case in which an acquirer made a friendly offer or reached an agreement to acquire a target that had been the subject of a hostile or unsolicited offer by another company. Note.-The sample consists of 228 U.S. targets in foreign takeovers and 228 U.S. control targets in domestic takeovers during the period 1980-98. The sample firms were restricted to those that involved a purchase price of $50 million or more. A U.S. target in the domestic takeover was matched to that in the foreign takeover by type of acquisition (friendly, hostile, and white knight), industry, firm size, and year of acquisition. Data on post-takeover layoffs, sell-offs, and investments and acquisitions were obtained from Predicasts F&S Index, Factiva, Moody's Manuals, annual reports, 10k forms, and the International Annual Report by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research. Post-takeover activities for 3 years are considered, starting from the date of takeover announcement. In panel A, the first number in the bracket is the number of target firms that engage in layoffs and/or sell-offs, and the second number is the number of target firms that do not engage in such activities. In panel B, the first number in the bracket is the number of target firms that make posttakeover investments and acquisitions, and the second number is the number of target firms that do not undertake such activities. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
than those in domestic takeovers. Furthermore, unlike targets in domestic takeovers, in which the frequency of layoffs and sell-offs is significantly higher for the period of hostile merger wave than it is for the period of synergistic merger wave, targets in foreign takeovers do not show any significant difference in the frequency of layoffs and sell-offs across the two subperiods.
Panel B of table 9 shows that, irrespective of time periods, targets in foreign takeovers always make significantly more investments and acquisitions than their domestic counterparts. It also shows that, among targets in foreign takeovers, no discernible difference exists in post-takeover investments and acquisitions across the two periods. We find a similar pattern for targets of domestic firms. These results indicate that post-takeover restructuring and expansionary policies by foreign acquirers are largely independent of the characteristics of the takeover market in the United States.
In unreported tests, we also experiment with an alternative measure of time periods, dividing our sample into two groups according to the business cycles: boom and recession periods. We obtain information on boom and recession periods from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). According to the NBER, there are three recessions over our sample period, namely, January 1980 to July 1980, July 1981 to November 1982, and July 1990 to March 1991. All other periods are considered to be boom. We find that layoffs/ sell-offs and investments/acquisitions activities for foreign takeovers remain stable across boom and recession periods.
E. The Likelihood of Post-takeover Layoffs/Sell-offs and Investments/Acquisitions
In this section, we investigate whether the likelihood of post-takeover layoffs/ sell-offs and investments/acquisitions is influenced by target and contest-specific characteristics. Since post-takeover restructuring and investment activities are likely to be influenced by the degree of synergistic motives and past target performance, we include as explanatory variables the fraction of target shares held by the bidder before the merger announcement, equity ownership by institutional investors, Tobin's q, and a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bidder and the target are in the same industry (at least to the first two digits of the SIC code).
To examine the impact of the tax reforms on the restructuring activities of U.S. target firms, we use a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bid is made after 1986 and the bidder comes from a country with a higher tax rate than the United States. We measure the tax rates of various countries as effective federal (or national) corporate tax rate that includes basic corporate tax rate and surtax. Information on the effective tax rates of various countries is obtained from Foreign and U.S. Corporate Income and Withholding Tax Rates (Ernst & Whinney 1988) , The International Handbook of Corporate and Personal Taxes (Chapman & Hall 1992 , 1994 and Corporate Taxes: A Worldwide Summary (Price Waterhouse 1997). We find that tax rates exhibit large variations across the countries. For example, as of December 31, 1987, countries with lower corporate tax rates than the United States (35%) included Switzerland (3.63% to 9.8%), Hong Kong (18%), and Kuwait (0%). Countries with higher corporate tax rates than the United States were the United Kingdom (35%; 25% if the profit is less than $100,000), Canada (35% after netting out 10% provincial abatement and 3% corporate surtax), France (42%), the Netherlands (42%), Denmark (50%), Germany (56% for corporate income and 36% for distributed profits), Japan (42% for corporate income and 32% for distributed profits), Australia (49%), Ireland (50%), New Zealand (48%), Belgium (43%), Sweden (52%), Saudi Arabia (45%), South Africa (50% for corporate income and 33.33% for undistributed profits if a company has not made a sufficient distri-bution), and Italy (36% and 56.25% for any amount distributed in excess of 64% of taxable income). Over our sample period, there have been changes in the corporate tax rates for some of our sample countries. We have kept track of these changes and have updated the differences in tax rates between United States and foreign countries throughout our sample period.
When foreign bidders overpay to targets, they may have strong incentives to quickly recoup the acquisition prices and thus be more inclined to follow post-takeover contractionary policies. To account for this possibility, we included as an additional explanatory variable the cumulative announcement abnormal returns from day Ϫ20 to day ϩ20 calculated in Section IV.
Finally, the regressions control for firm size (log of the market value of equity), leverage, types of takeovers (a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm is the target of hostile takeovers), bidder competition (a dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is more than one bidder or a bid revision), and method of payment (a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the method of payment is cash).
5 Table 10 reports the results from logistic regressions in which the dependent variable equals one if restructuring or investment activity occurred and zero otherwise. The first two columns show the regression estimates for the targets of foreign acquirers. In regression 1, we examine the factors that influence the probability that a target will lay off employees or sell off assets after a takeover. The results show that the likelihood of layoffs or sell-offs increases when the target has a low Tobin's q and when it is involved in a hostile takeover. The coefficient on Tobin's q is negative and significant at the 0.01 level, and the coefficient on the dummy variable for hostile takeover is positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The negative coefficient on Tobin's q suggests that foreign bidders have a stronger incentive to undertake restructuring activity when U.S. targets have a lower growth opportunity. The positive coefficient on hostile takeover suggests that foreign bidders are more likely to implement a revised operating strategy in the targets when they engage in a hostile takeover. We also find that larger targets engage in more layoff or sell-off activities. None of the other variables are statistically significant.
In regression 2, we examine the probability that a target makes post-takeover investments or acquisitions. In addition to the explanatory variables used in the previous regressions, regression 2 includes a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a target lays off employees or sells off assets after a takeover. We include this variable to see whether post-takeover expansionary policies are related to post-takeover contractionary policies in targets. We find that the likelihood of post-takeover investments or acquisitions is positively related to post-takeover layoffs or sell-offs. The coefficient on the dummy variable for layoffs or sell-offs is significantly positive at the 0.01 level. Thus, post-takeover 5. See Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) , Travlos (1987) , Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) , and Morck et al. (1988) for an extensive discussion of the importance of these variables in takeovers. Note.-The sample consists of 228 U.S. targets in foreign takeovers and 228 U.S. control targets in domestic takeovers during the period 1980-98. The sample firms were restricted to those that involved a purchase price of $50 million or more. A U.S. target in the domestic takeover was matched to that in the foreign takeover by type of acquisition (friendly, hostile, and white knight), industry, firm size, and year of acquisition. Data on target financial characteristics and institutional ownership were obtained from the COMPUSTAT and Thomson Financial. The dependent variable equals one if a particular activity occurs and zero otherwise. Tobin's q p (market value of equity ϩ book value of debt)/book value of assets. p-values are in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
downsizing actions are highly likely to be met by concomitant post-takeover expansionary actions. This finding indicates that rather than seeking to unlock the values in U.S. targets through downsizing, foreign acquirers engage in layoffs and sell-offs as part of their efforts to reposition the business of these targets. The likelihood of post-takeover investments or acquisitions is also significantly and positively related to firm size, with a p-value of 0.03. In the next two regressions in columns 3 and 4, we report the logistic regression estimates for the targets of U.S. acquirers. As with the previous results for the targets of foreign acquirers, the likelihood of layoffs or sell-offs decreases with Tobin's q and increases with firm size (regression 3). The likelihood of layoffs or sell-offs is also more likely when the target is involved in a hostile takeover. Unlike the results for foreign acquirers, however, the coefficient on the cumulative announcement return (Ϫ20, 20) is positive and significant at the 0.05 level, and the coefficient on leverage ratio is also positive and significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, U.S. acquirers are more likely to be involved in downsizing activity when they have paid relatively high premiums to their targets and when they face larger post-acquisition debt burden.
Regression 4 examines the probability that target firms in domestic takeovers engage in post-takeover investments and acquisitions. The likelihood of posttakeover investments and acquisitions decreases when the cumulative announcement return (Ϫ20, 20) of the target is higher. The p-value for the coefficient on this variable is 0.00. The negative coefficient on cumulative announcement returns suggests that post-takeover investments and acquisitions are less likely when domestic bidders pay relatively high premiums to their targets. Thus, takeover premiums paid to targets play an important role in determining post-takeover contractionary and expansionary policies established by domestic acquirers in target firms. We also find that targets that receive multiple-bidder offers engage in more investment/acquisition activities.
In the last two regressions, presented in columns 5 and 6, we estimate the difference in the likelihood of post-takeover contractionary and expansionary actions between foreign and domestic takeovers for a pooled sample of 228 targets of foreign acquirers and 228 control targets of U.S. acquirers. These regressions include a dummy variable, which equals one if an acquirer is from the foreign country and zero otherwise. We find that, in regression 5, the coefficient on this dummy is negative and significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting that foreign acquirers are less likely to engage in layoff and/or selloff activity than are domestic acquirers, even after controlling for other explanatory variables. In regression 6, the coefficient on this dummy is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, foreign bidders are more likely to make post-takeover investments or acquisitions than are domestic bidders.
IV. The Effects of Acquisition Announcements on U.S. Targets
We compute abnormal returns using a standard event study methodology. Market model parameters are estimated using 200 trading days of return data, Note.-The sample consists of 228 U.S. targets in foreign takeovers and 228 U.S. control targets in domestic takeovers during the period 1980-98. The sample firms were restricted to those that involved a purchase price of $50 million or more. A U.S. target in the domestic takeover was matched to that in the foreign takeover by type of acquisition (friendly, hostile, and white knight), industry, firm size, and year of acquisition. The CARs from day Ϫt to day ϩt were computed as the difference between realized returns and estimated returns using the market model. The parameters of the market model are estimated over the pre-event period of Ϫ220 to Ϫ21. p-values for Z-tests (Dodd and Warner 1983) are reported in parentheses below the mean and those for signed-ranked tests are reported in parentheses below the median. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
starting 20 days before the takeover announcement. The daily abnormal returns are accumulated to get the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). For single and unrevised offers, the CAR (t 1 , t 2 ) is computed from t 1 days before the announcement of the first bid through t 2 days after the announcement of the first bid. For multiple bid and revised offers, the CAR (t 1 , t 2 ) is calculated from t 1 days before the first takeover announcement to t 2 days after the last revision by the successful bidder. The cumulative standardized abnormal returns (CSAR) are calculated using the procedure described by Dodd and Warner (1983) . We use the t-statistic to test the hypothesis that the average CARs are equal to zero and the sign-rank test statistic to test the hypothesis that the CARs are distributed symmetrically around zero. These results are consistent with those of previous studies, which show that the U.S. target shareholders obtain significantly larger gains from foreign mergers and acquisitions than from domestic mergers and acquisitions (Harris and Ravenscraft 1991; Kang 1993; Servaes and Zenner 1994) .
A. Target Returns
B. The Relation between Target Returns and Explanatory Variables
To examine the cross-sectional variation in target returns, we estimate multivariate regressions using the CSAR (Ϫ20, 20) as dependent variables. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and White's (1980) adjustment for heteroskedasticity. 6 In unreported tests, we repeat all analyses below using the CSAR(-1, 1) as the dependent variable and obtain results that are qualitatively similar to those reported in this article.
Previous studies suggest that target returns are affected by target characteristics and deal-specific variables. One of the important target characteristics that can affect target returns is Tobin's q. Lang et al. (1989) find that the largest total takeover gain occurs when bidders with a high Tobin's q acquire targets with a low Tobin's q and target returns are negatively related to its Tobin's q. To the extent that Tobin's q measures either growth opportunities or the managerial ability of the firm, we would expect U.S. targets with low Tobin's q to realize higher returns, since these firms are likely to realize more benefits from the takeovers.
The size of the target can also affect target returns. If the foreign firm's main incentive for acquisition is to realize a synergy effect by increasing economies of scale, then a larger-size target, which is more likely to produce such an effect, will be associated with a higher target return. Furthermore, larger targets are likely to have a greater presence in their product markets, wider distribution networks, and more established brand names that they can bring to the combined firms. Consequently, we expect the size of target, measured by the logarithm of the market value of equity, to have a positive effect on its return.
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In a similar vein, to the extent that mergers between closely related firms 6. To make sure that our results are not driven by outlier observations, in tests not reported here, we also perform robust regressions in Koenker and Bassett (1978) and obtain results similar to those reported here.
7. Some studies examining the importance of firm size use the relative size of the bidding and target firms rather than the size of target firms, but these find mixed results. While Peterson and Peterson (1991) find a positive relation between the relative size and target returns, Asquith et al. (1983) and Servaes (1991) do not find such a relation. Since information on the market value of equity for many foreign acquirers in our sample is not available, we are not able to use the relative size of acquirer and target as an explanatory variable. create more synergistic gains, we expect an industrial relation between bidders and targets to have a positive effect on target returns. We measure the potential effect of industry relatedness between acquirer and target using a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the bidder is in the same industry (at least to the first two digits of the SIC code) as that of the target.
Equity ownership by institutional investors may be another important determinant of target returns. If institutional investors are active, their presence effectively increases target firm's bargaining power and can force acquirers to pay a high premium. Alternatively, if institutional investors enhance the efficiency of decision making in the target firm by actively monitoring target management (Shleifer and Vishny 1986) , their presence is likely to help to ensure that only deals that provide sufficient benefit to target shareholders can be completed. We expect, therefore, institutional ownership in target to increase target returns.
Since a bidder's substantial control in target before the acquisition reduces the potential resistance by the target to takeover offers, equity holding by bidder in target before the takeover announcement is likely to reduce the premium the bidder has to offer. Therefore, we expect equity holding by a bidder prior to the takeover offer to be negatively related to target returns.
According to Buckley and Casson (1976) and Dunning (1977) , foreign acquisitions involving targets with more firm-specific advantages can lead to greater synergistic gains by enabling foreign acquirers to internalize the benefit of investments in the host country. We examine the effect of target-specific investments using the ratios of R&D expenses, 8 advertising expenses, and capital expenditure, all normalized by total sale, and the ratio of operating income to total assets. We expect target returns to be positively related to these variables.
Deal-specific variables are also important determinants of target returns. First, changes in 1986 U.S. tax laws can have an impact on target returns. Scholes and Wolfson (1990) argue that these changes in tax rules neutralized most of the tax advantages available in domestic takeovers. However, because of the differences in statutory tax rates across tax jurisdictions, the tax changes made U.S. firms attractive targets to foreign firms, indicating that the tax advantages of foreign bidders relative to U.S. bidders increased after 1986. Therefore, target shareholders are likely to experience higher returns after 1986 when the bidder is from a country with higher corporate tax rate than when it is from the United States.
Second, the method of payment can affect target returns. In particular, in comparison to other types of offers, an all-cash offer is likely to provide higher return to target shareholders, because the bidder is expected to offer the extra premium to the target to compensate target shareholders for tax liabilities 8. Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) use R&D expenses for the target's industry, not for the target, to examine U.S. target shareholder wealth gains in foreign takeovers. They find that target wealth gains are positively related to the ratio of R&D expenses to sales for the target's industry. immediately due. Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1983) and Huang and Walkling (1987) found that target shareholders derived a significantly higher return when the takeover offer was made in cash. Travlos (1987) also offers some evidence that is consistent with a cash offer providing higher target returns. Therefore, we include a dummy variable that indicates a cash offer, and we expect such an offer to have a positive effect on target returns.
Third, Bradley et al. (1988) provide evidence that deals involving multiplebidder contests provide more benefits to target shareholders than do singlebidder deals. This result is consistent with the notion that participation of multiple bidders in a takeover contest facilitates an auction of target firm and enables greater information sharing on the sources of takeover gains. We control for this effect using a dummy variable that indicates multiple-bidder contests.
Finally, target returns may depend on the type of acquisition. In particular, in a hostile takeover, the active resistance by target management may force bidders to offer a significant premium in their attempt to acquire the target. We control for the type of takeover using a dummy variable indicating whether or not the takeover is hostile. Table 12 reports regression estimates for U.S. targets. Regressions 1 and 2, which use the sample of 228 targets in foreign takeovers, show that the target returns are positively related to the U.S. tax rule change of 1986. These results differ from those of Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) , Kang (1993) , and Dewenter (1995) , who find no support for the Scholes and Wolfson tax argument. The coefficient on the ratio of advertising expenses to sales is positive and significant with a p-value of 0.04. This result indicates that the possession of firm-specific advantages, such as intensive advertising activity, is an important determinant of foreign takeover premiums. Consistent with our expectation, target returns also increase with equity ownership by institutional investors and target size.
Consistent with the finding of Bradley et al. (1988) , our results indicate that target shareholders earn higher returns from multiple-bidder contests than from single-bidder offers. They also earn higher returns when foreign bidders use cash as the method of payment. In contrast, target returns are significantly negatively related to the fraction of target shares held by the foreign bidder before the merger announcement and Tobin's q. Given that multinational firms tend to have competitive advantages, such as superior production technology and management skills not possessed by local firms, a negative coefficient on Tobin's q partly suggests that a potential source of foreign takeover gains is rooted in the ability of the bidder to efficiently reallocate the target resources subsequent to the acquisition.
Regressions 3 and 4, which use the sample of 228 targets in domestic takeovers, show that target returns are positively related to equity ownership by institutional investors, the ratio of R&D expenses to sales, and past operating performance. Target returns are also higher when there are multiple bidders and when targets are involved in hostile takeovers. As in the results for foreign takeovers, the coefficient on Tobin's q is negative and significant.
In regressions 5 and 6, we use a pooled sample of the targets in foreign and domestic takeovers. We find that most of variables that are significant either in foreign or domestic regressions are also significant in the pooled regressions.
If the stock market takes acquiring firms' value-enhancing future restructuring and investment activities for U.S. targets into account when assessing the market values of acquirers, we would expect the returns to acquirers and the portfolio of acquirer and target to be systematically related to these activities. In unreported tests, we examine this issue using a subsample of 25 foreign takeovers in which bidders have ADR programs and information on their daily stock returns is available in the CRSP tape. In these tests, we use the CSARs (Ϫ20, 20) for bidders and the portfolio of acquirer and target as the dependent variables. The explanatory variables consist of those in table 12 and two dummy variables that indicate, respectively, the occurrence of post-takeover layoffs/sell-offs and investments/acquisitions. The portfolio CSAR is the value-weighted CSAR of the bidder and the target. We find that the coefficients on the dummy variables indicating layoffs/sell-offs and investments/acquisitions are not significant in bidder and portfolio regressions. We find similar results for domestic takeovers.
V. Summary and Conclusion
This study examines the motives that drive foreign takeovers and the potential sources of takeover gains using a sample of 228 U.S. targets acquired by foreign firms and a control sample of 228 U.S. targets acquired by domestic firms. We find that layoffs and sell-offs are a less important source of gains for foreign takeovers than for domestic takeovers. We also find that the function of foreign takeovers is similar to that of domestic hostile takeovers in that both types of takeovers result in allocation of target assets to strategic buyers in the same or related industries as those assets. Although foreign firms engage in fewer layoffs and sell-offs than do their U.S. counterparts, acquired U.S. firms subsequently make substantial post-takeover investments or acquisitions, suggesting that foreign firms acquire U.S. targets for synergistic purposes.
The analysis of the likelihood of post-takeover restructuring activities in U.S. targets indicates that, for both foreign and domestic takeovers, layoffs and/or sell-offs are more likely when target firms have lower Tobin's q and when takeovers are hostile. However, unlike those in domestic takeovers, U.S. targets in foreign takeovers are more likely to make post-takeover investments and acquisitions when they also engage in post-takeover layoffs or sell-offs.
Finally, we document evidence that U.S. targets earn higher returns when the corporate tax rate in the United States is relatively lower than that for the Note.-The sample consists of 228 U.S. targets in foreign takeovers and 228 U.S. control targets in domestic takeovers during the period 1980-98. The sample firms were restricted to those that involved a purchase price of $50 million or more. A U.S. target in the domestic takeover was matched to that in the foreign takeover by type of acquisition (friendly, hostile, and white knight), industry, firm size, and year of acquisition. The CSARs are calculated using the procedure described by Dodd and Warner (1983) . The dependent variable, CSAR (Ϫ20, 20), is computed as the difference between realized returns and estimated returns based on market model over the interval (Ϫ20, 20) . The parameters of the market model are estimated over the pre-event period of Ϫ220 to Ϫ21. Data on target financial characteristics and institutional ownership were obtained from the COMPUSTAT and Thomson Financial. Tobin's q p (market value of equity ϩ book value of debt)/book value of assets. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
foreign bidders in their home country, when Tobin's q for U.S. targets is lower, and when the ratio of advertising expenditure to sales for U.S. targets is higher. Taken together, our results suggest that the realization of synergy is the main motive behind foreign takeovers and that the shareholders of U.S. target firms earn higher returns for those types of takeovers.
